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Is a Voluntary Dismissal Without Prejudice Under Rule 41(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure a “Final Proceeding” Under Rule 60(b)?

March 20, 2025

The U.S. Supreme Court addressed this question in Waetzig v. Halliburton Energy Services, Inc., 146 S. Ct. 690 (Feb. 26, 2025).  The case involved an employment dispute that Waetzig brought in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado. 146 S. Ct. at 693-94.  Waetzig subsequently submitted his claims for arbitration after Halliburton said he was required to do so. Id.  Waetzig could have, but did not, seek to stay or administratively close his district court action but instead voluntarily dismissed it without prejudice under Rule 41(a). Id. 

 

Waetzig lost in the arbitration and returned to the district court to challenge the arbitration award. Id. at 694-95.  Rather than initiate a new lawsuit, Waetzig filed a motion under the old docket number and asked that the case be reopened and the arbitration award vacated. Id.  But there was a problem—the Rule 41(a) dismissal terminated the original case and thus filing a new motion in that case was, in theory, impossible. Id.  Waetzig was ordered to show cause why taking jurisdiction over the motion was justified. Id.  Waetzig said the case could be reopened under Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id.  Rule 60(b) allows a court,“[o]n motion and just terms,” to “relieve a party . . . from a final judgment, order, or proceeding” and sets forth the conditions and requirements for such relief. Id.  Agreeing with Waetzig, the district court granted Rule 60(b) relief and reopened the case. Id.  In a separate order, it granted Waetzig’s motion to vacate the arbitration award. Id.  Halliburton appealed to the Tenth Circuit, which, splitting from other Circuits that have considered the issue, held that a voluntary dismissal without prejudice could not be a final proceeding. Id. at 695.  It reasoned that a final proceeding must involve, at a minimum, a judicial determination with finality, and a voluntary dismissal requires neither the entry of judgment nor issuance of an order by the court. Id.

 

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether a Rule 41(a) dismissal without prejudice is a “final judgment, order, or proceeding” under Rule 60(b). Id. at 695.  In deciding this question, the Court first found that Halliburton’s challenge to the district court’s jurisdiction to rule on the motion to vacate presented no barrier to deciding the question for which certiorari was granted. Id. at 695-96.  It thus declined to take up the separate jurisdictional issue and explained that the power under Rule 60(b) to reopen a case voluntarily dismissed without prejudice “must be addressed before any subsequent jurisdictional ques­tion is considered.” Id.  The Court found this was confirmed by the procedural history of the case. Id. (noting that Waetzig’s case had to be reopened before his motion to vacate could be decided and that, consistent with this understanding, the district court issued two separate orders: first, an order reopening the case pur­suant to Rule 60(b) and sec­ond, an order vacating the arbitration award).

 

Turning to the question at hand, the Court first addressed the meaning of “final” in Rule 60(b). Id. at 696-98.  It held that “[i]n the context of Rule 60(b), a voluntary dismissal without prejudice is ‘final’ because it terminates the case.” Id.  Moving on, the Court next held that “a voluntary dismissal without preju­dice counts as a ‘proceeding’ under Rule 60(b).” Id. at 698-701.  Finally, the Court explained how its reading of Rule 60(b) was “buttressed by the historical context in which the Rule was enacted.” Id.  Based on the foregoing, the Court unanimously held that “a Rule 41(a) voluntary dismissal without prejudice counts as a ‘final proceeding’ under Rule 60(b).” Id.  Accordingly, “[w]hen the requirements of Rule 60(b) are satisfied, a district court may relieve a party from such a dismissal and reopen the case.” Id.  The Court did not address whether that relief in Waetzig’s case was proper, nor did it address whether the district court could exercise jurisdiction over Waetzig’s motion to vacate the arbitration award. Id.  These questions, the Court said, “are left to the court below on remand, to the extent the relevant arguments have been preserved.” Id.

 

While Waetzig involved an employment dispute, the Court’s holding is not limited to that context.